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THE BACKGROUND TO THE CASE 
 
Until the seminal judgment of Radmacher v Granatino1 pre-nuptial or 
pre-marital agreements were given limited weight in English law. Prior to this 
decision there had been considerable debate about the status in law of all 
nuptial settlements both pre and post marriage. The key question for 
Radmacher was whether pre-nuptial settlements should attract equal weight as 
agreements drawn up during the course of a marriage. In MacLeod v 
MacLeod2 the Privy Council finally resolved the issue with regard to post-
nuptial settlements holding that agreements drawn up post marriage would 
carry weight when the court decides a claim for financial relief under s 25 
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. The English courts, unlike other jurisdictions, 
have always been reluctant to uphold agreements, which purport to deprive 
the court of its jurisdiction3 in deciding financial provision. There was also an 
underlying presumption that parties to a marriage did not intend their 
agreements to form legally binding contracts and finding adequate 
consideration within such agreements was often difficult unless the agreement 
is incorporated in a deed.4 The effect of the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Radmacher was not to reverse this approach. Pre-nuptial agreements were not 
made binding on the court but rather the court is invited to give weight to all 
nuptial agreements subject to certain safeguards. The subsequent decision in 
∗ LLB, LLM (London), Professor of Law, Barrister, the University of Buckingham. 
1 [2010] UKSC 42. 
2 [2008] UKSC 64. 
3 See Hyman v Hyman [1929] AC 601; Edgar v Edgar [1980] 1 WLR 1410; J Wall,  
‘N v N (Jurisdiction: Pre-Nuptial Agreement)’ [1999] 2 FLR 745; J Connell, ‘M v M 
(Pre-Nuptial Agreement)’ [2002] 1 FLR 654; X v Y (Y and Z Intervening) [2002] 1 
FLR 508. 
4 See Judith Bray, ‘Pre-nuptial Agreements under Scrutiny’ (2009) DLJ 131.  
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Luckwell v Limata5 gives guidance as to when the court will be prepared to 
deviate from pre-marital agreements even when the parties have been given 
independent legal advice and both parties are fully aware of the possible effect 
of such an agreement.   
 
THE DECISION IN RADMACHER V GRANATINO 
 
The facts of this case are well known. Nicolas Granatino, a French 
national, claimed financial relief from his very wealthy wife, Katrin 
Radmacher, a German national on the breakdown of their marriage. This was 
in spite of a pre-nuptial agreement which both the parties had signed three 
months before marrying in 1998 in London. The agreement stated that neither 
party would seek financial provision from the other. It had been drawn up in 
Germany by a notary and was written in German and as the claimant was not 
fluent in written German it had to be translated into English by the German 
notary. The husband had not sought a formal translation nor had he sought 
legal advice although the German notary had urged him to do so. The 
agreement was intended to protect the current wealth and property interests of 
the wife who was also expected to receive further large sums from her family 
and it had been drawn up partly on the instigation of the wife’s father. At the 
time of the marriage the husband was himself relatively wealthy; he came 
from what was described in the case as “a well-to-do family”6 and he was 
working as a banker for JP Morgan, earning a salary in excess of £120,000 
and he had excellent future prospects. They made their home in London and 
had two children. However he became disillusioned with banking which had 
taken its toll on family life and decided to embark on an academic career 
taking up research studies at Oxford, which led to a considerable loss of 
salary. By then the marriage was in difficulties and the parties agreed to 
separate in 2006. In spite of the existence of the pre-nuptial agreement the 
husband claimed he was not bound by its terms and sought financial relief. 
The Judge at first instance7 awarded the claimant a substantial sum by 
way of financial relief. She attached little weight to the pre-nuptial agreement 
because of the circumstances in which it had been signed; in particular the 
lack of legal advice although she did take note of the fact that he had agreed to 
be bound by an agreement which he had then signed. The Court of Appeal 
disagreed and held that the agreement should have been given decisive weight 
holding that the judge had been wrong to find that the circumstances in which 
the pre-nuptial agreement had been reached reduced the weight to be attached 
5 [2014] EWHC 502 (Fam). 
6 [2010] UKSC 42 [534]. 
7 Mrs Justice Baron. 
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to the agreement. It held that the award should make provision for the 
husband’s role as the father of the two children, but should not otherwise 
make provision for his own long-term needs. The husband appealed to the 
Supreme Court. As mentioned earlier since Macleod v Macleod8 the English 
courts have given effect to post-nuptial agreements but were not prepared to 
give effect to ante-nuptial or pre-nuptial agreements. The reasons included: 
fear that pressure could have been brought by the party who had superior 
financial means when a marriage was imminent and a sense that pre-nuptial 
agreements would be more appropriate for legislative rather than judicial 
development. Crossley v Crossley9 was an exception where the terms of a pre-
nuptial agreement were upheld in spite of the fact that it had stated that neither 
party should apply to court for financial relief. Crossley was held to be 
exceptional on the facts because it had been a short marriage, barely a year 
between two very wealthy individuals who had both taken legal advice before 
entering into the agreement. Both were marrying for the second time and both 
had children from a previous marriage.  
The Supreme Court upheld the judgment of the Court of Appeal in 
Radmacher and gave weight to the pre-nuptial agreement. Although it 
welcomed the decision in Macleod for “sweeping away the archaic notions of 
public policy which have tended to obfuscate the approach to nuptial 
agreements”.10 It held that Macleod was wrong to hold that ante-nuptial or 
pre-nuptial agreements are fundamentally different from post-nuptial 
agreements. Three key issues were identified by the Supreme Court: 
 
a) Were there circumstances attending the making of the agreement 
that detract from the weight that should be accorded to it? 
b) Were there circumstances attending the making of the agreement 
that enhance the weight that should be accorded to it; the foreign 
element? 
c) Did the circumstances prevailing when the court’s order was made 
make it fair or just to depart from the agreement?  
 
Under (a) the main factors which would detract from the agreement would 
include evidence of undue influence of pressure or any factor suggesting that 
the husband or wife did not enter into it with their own free will. Baron J had 
taken into account the lack of independent legal advice for the claimant but 
the Supreme Court held that in this case “insofar as the safeguards were not 
strictly satisfied, this was not material on the particular facts of this case.”11 
8 [2008] UKSC 64. 
9 [2008] 1FLR 1467. 
10 Macleod (n 8) [561]. 
11 Ibid [562]. 
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The Court accepted that in cases in the past the nationality of the parties 
may have had some influence on the issue. Where the parties were from a 
jurisdiction or jurisdiction where an ante-nuptial agreement would be binding 
then a court from the United Kingdom in the past would then take judicial 
notice of this. However the court concluded that “any agreement made after 
this judgment, the question of whether the parties intended their agreement to 
take effect is unlikely to be in issue, so foreign law will not need to be 
considered in the future.”12 
Finally, the court held that in the light of such cases as White v White13 
and McFarlane v McFarlane14 the overriding consideration of any court in 
ancillary relief proceedings is that of fairness so that criteria must be applied 
to any ante-nuptial agreement. According to MacFarlane the court determines 
what is fair by looking at the three strands of need, compensation and sharing. 
These three strands should equally be applied to ante-nuptial agreements to 
determine whether the agreement and the following proposition should be 
applied to both ante-nuptial and post-nuptial agreements.  
 
“The court should give effect to a nuptial agreement that is freely 
entered into by each party with full appreciation of its implications 
unless in the circumstances prevailing it would not be fair to hold the 
parties to their agreement.”15 
 
It is this last factor that of “fairness” the court had to address in the recent 
case of Luckwell v Limata. When will the court hold the terms of an 
agreement not to be “fair” and so override an agreement that has been entered 
into freely by two parties who are both fully aware of the consequences of 
such an agreement? There were several similarities with the facts of 
Radmacher.  As in Radmacher the case concerned an application for ancillary 
relief by a husband and there were children of the family who spent time with 
both parents. Again there was a marked disparity in the financial resources of 
the two parties. The wife was very wealthy although she fell short of the 
wealth of Katrin Radmacher. This presented a more difficult case for the court 
to determine because any financial provision for the father would impact on 
the lifestyle of the mother and the children, which was not the case in 
Radmacher.  
 
 
 
12 [2008] UKSC 64 [563]. 
13 [2001] 1 AC 596. 
14 [2006] 2 AC 618. 
15 Radmacher (n 1) [564].  
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THE HIGH COURT 
 
The core issue of the case 
 
This case concerned a claim by a husband for financial provision upon 
divorce. Before the marriage the parties had entered into a “Pre-marital 
agreement” in which the husband had agreed that he would not make any 
claim either during or after the marriage in relation to the wife’s separate 
property or gifts made to her by her family. Two separate “supplemental 
agreements” were made during the course of the marriage on occasions when 
the wife’s parents and in particular her father made substantial gifts to the 
wife. It was agreed that firstly, the marriage would not have taken place had 
the pre-marital agreement not been made and secondly, the parents would not 
have made gifts to the daughter unless the supplementary agreements had 
been made. In making a claim for financial provision the husband was found 
to be acting in breach of both these agreements. The core issue in the case was 
how much weight should be placed on the pre-marital and supplementary 
agreements, by the court in exercising its discretion under the Matrimonial 
Causes Act 1973, s 25 and further whether it would be right to dismiss the 
husband’s claim in the light of the agreements. 
 
The facts of the case 
 
The couple involved in the case were Francesco Limata (Frankie) and 
Victoria Luckwell. Victoria’s parents, Mike and Mary Luckwell, played a key 
role in the couple’s relationship but had separated in 1997. Frankie and 
Victoria married in July 2005 but had already been living together for about a 
year. The marriage date had been brought forward because Victoria was 
pregnant with their first child. Just less than two weeks before the wedding 
Frankie agreed to sign a pre-marital agreement [the PMA], which was 
prefaced with a recital stating: 
 
“Victoria and Francesco each specifically acknowledges and agrees 
that the marriage would not be taking place without this Agreement 
having been negotiated and signed by each of them.”16 
 
The agreement referred to the separate property of Victoria and that of 
Francesco and at the time Victoria owned a property in London called Elm 
Row which was worth £750,000 and Frankie owned a flat in Eastlake House 
which was worth £50,000. Apart from the flat Frankie had no significant 
16 Luckwell v Limata [2014] EWCA 502 (fam) [12]. 
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assets or property whereas Victoria had “substantial inheritance prospects” 
from her parents. The judge drew particular attention to Recital K which 
acknowledged that in certain jurisdictions it may not be possible to oust the 
jurisdiction of the court’s power to override the terms of an agreement the 
parties intended that this agreement would be treated as binding and of full 
force and effect.17 The judge concluded that “he [Frankie] can have been 
under no doubt or illusion that in the event of separation and divorce the 
agreement was still intended to govern” but he also concluded that “Victoria 
knew from Recital K that the agreement could be ‘overridden’ by the court in 
certain jurisdictions and will unquestionably have been advised that England 
and Wales is one of them.”18 At the time when the agreement was drawn up 
Frankie had received independent legal advice from a solicitor experienced in 
pre-marital matters which had been highlighted as a key requirement in 
Radmacher19 and of course the claimant had not availed himself of such 
advice in that case. 
After the marriage the parties made a series of moves around various 
properties in London. Initially they moved to a flat at Westbourne Terrace 
bought with capital from Victoria and her father Mike. After less than a year 
they moved again to a house in Avonmore Road costing approximately £1 
million including legal fees. The cost was financed by Mike and Mary, 
Victoria’s parents. The judge concluded that without the pre-marital 
agreement the parents would not have agreed to finance this purchase. A 
second agreement was drawn up referring to the first PMA. It expressly stated 
that this house in Avonmore Road would be treated as Victoria’s separate 
property. Within a matter of months the couple moved again into property at 
Connaught Square owned by Mike. This was in the words of the Holman J “a 
fine, period house in a prestigious square, the value of which has escalated in 
the last few years”.20 Soon afterwards the property was offered to Victoria by 
Mike on certain terms and conditions. There was no question that the house 
was being offered to Frankie as well. The judge recognised that at this time 
December 2007 Mike had a very low regard for Frankie. “I am quite clear that 
by now Mike had low regard for Frankie and did not trust him an inch. He 
clearly regarded him as lazy and workshy…He had always regarded Frankie 
as a gold-digger who had married for money and from whom Victoria’s 
money and the assets he now proposed to give Victoria had to be utterly 
protected.”  
Mike requested that a second supplemental agreement be drawn up before 
Mike was prepared to transfer the house in Connaught Square to Victoria. 
17 Ibid [18]. 
18 McLeod v McLeod [2008] UKPC 64 [19]. 
19 Radmacher (n 1). 
20 McLeod (n 18) [31]. 
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Frankie would be allowed to live there but never to own it. One important 
condition in this agreement was that Victoria would never sell, mortgage or 
charge Connaught Square without Mike’s prior consent. This was not put into 
writing but in evidence Mike agreed that he thought Victoria would feel 
bound by the promise she had made to him. Of course this had no effect in 
law and the judge stated that the court would not be bound by this promise or 
any other oral agreement between the parties. By 2008 both parties were 
living at Connaught Square with their young son and two further children 
were born. Frankie had a series of jobs but was eventually made redundant 
and the family began to suffer serious problems. Both Victoria and Frankie 
suffered from mental health issues and then a third child was born with 
serious health issues.    
By November 2012 the marriage was in serious difficulties and Frankie 
left the family home. In March 2013 Victoria presented a petition for divorce. 
After Frankie moved out of the family home the personal circumstances of the 
parties were starkly different. Victoria led an affluent lifestyle supported by 
her parents from whom she received £81,000 per annum enabling her to have 
a series of foreign holidays and to engage the services of a nanny. By contrast 
Frankie had no fixed address and lived firstly with his mother who ran a bed 
and breakfast hotel and then with the help of a loan he took a short lease of a 
small flat where he could have his children to stay. He had very limited 
earnings from a job paid at the minimum wage. With this background the 
claimant husband made a claim for financial provision. The case can be seen 
as a challenge to the effectiveness of a pre-nuptial agreement made with the 
aid of legal advice and where both parties are fully aware of the effect of 
signing an agreement. 
 
The preliminary issue: should the case be heard in private? 
 
The case was heard before Mr Justice Holman who sat throughout in 
public. The preliminary issue to be determined by the judge was whether the 
case should be heard in public. He applied Rule 27.10 of the Family 
Procedure Rules 201021 and decided that the effect of the rule was that it 
provided a starting point or default position that proceedings for a financial 
remedy after divorce will be held in private rather than a presumption in 
favour of cases of this nature being heard in private. He gave a number of 
persuasive reasons why he thought this case should be heard in public. Firstly 
he pointed to the strong shift towards greater transparency in family law 
21 Family Procedure Rules, r 27. 10 provide: ‘(1) Proceedings to which these rules 
apply will be held in private, except – (a) where these rules or any other enactment 
provide otherwise; (b) subject to any enactment provide otherwise.’ 
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hearings22 which he felt was only satisfied by inviting the public into the court 
room and would not satisfied by merely publishing judgments. “Whilst 
greater publication of judgments will make for greater transparency, 
publication of the judgment alone suffers from the limitation, or even defect, 
that the public can only read what the judge chooses to say. It is only if the 
public are able to see and hear from themselves how the proceedings unfold in 
the court room, what the oral evidence and arguments are, and indeed how the 
judge comports himself, that there is true transparency, open justice and 
public accountability.”23 He argued that since witnesses in other types of 
cases have to give their evidence in public there was no reason why witnesses 
in a case determining financial provision should be allowed to give evidence 
in private. Finally he referred to the fact that the core issue in this case 
concerning the weight to be given to a pre-nuptial agreement was one of 
considerable and legitimate current and public interest.24 He concluded that 
the case should be heard in public. 
 
The findings of the trial Judge 
 
Having considered the facts of the case, Mr Justice Holman pointed out 
that it was then his statutory duty to apply the different subsections of s 25 
Matrimonial Causes Act. His approach followed Radmacher was to consider 
the agreement and the supplementary agreements but only insofar as the 
factors in s 25 had been met. The most significant factors in this case were the 
resources of each party, their needs and their contributions. He concluded that 
at the time of trial neither party had any earned income although Frankie, who 
was currently studying for a degree had the capacity to earn a reasonable 
salary in the future. He also pointed out that although both parties needed a 
suitable home Frankie did not have a permanent home so the children could 
come to visit him. He then applied Radmacher and made some significant 
comments on the effect that pre-nuptial agreements now have on applications 
under s 25. Counsel for the applicant husband drafted a number of 
propositions of law which the judge adopted and quoted at length. 
 
“1. It is the court, and not the parties, that decides the ultimate 
question of what provision is to be made; 
 
22 He referred to the Practice Guidance on Transparency in the family courts; 
Publication of judgments, issued by the President of the Family Division on 16 
January 2014 which came into effect on 3 February 2014 therefore preceding the start 
of the hearing in this case. 
23 Luckwell (n 16) [5]. 
24 Ibid. 
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2. The over-arching criterion remains the search for ‘fairness’, in 
accordance with section 25 as explained by the House of Lords in 
Miller/McFarlane (ie needs, sharing and compensation). But an 
agreement is capable of altering what is fair, including in relation to 
‘need’; 
 
3. An agreement (assuming it is not ‘impugned’ for procedural 
unfairness, such as duress) should be given weight in that process, 
although that weight may be anything from slight to decisive in an 
appropriate case; 
 
4. The weight to be given to an agreement may be enhanced or 
reduced by a variety of factors; 
 
5. Effect should be given to an agreement that is entered into freely 
with full appreciation of the implications unless in the circumstances 
prevailing it would not be fair to hold the parties to that agreement. ie 
There is at least a burden on the husband to show that the agreement 
should not prevail; 
 
6. Whether it will ‘not be fair to hold the parties to the agreement’ will 
necessarily depend on the facts, but some guidance can be given: 
 
i) A nuptial agreement cannot be allowed to prejudice the 
reasonable requirements of any children; 
ii) Respect for autonomy, including a decision as to the manner in 
which their financial affairs should be regulated, may be 
particularly relevant where the agreement addresses the existing 
circumstances and not merely the contingencies of an uncertain 
future; 
iii) There is nothing inherently unfair in an agreement making 
provision dealing with existing non-marital property including 
anticipated future receipts, and there may be good objective 
justifications for it, such as obligations towards family members; 
iv) The longer the marriage has lasted the more likely it is that 
events have rendered what might have seemed fair at the time of 
the making of the agreement unfair now, particularly if the 
position is not as envisaged; 
v) It is unlikely to be fair that one party is left in a predicament of 
real need while the other has ‘a sufficiency or more’; 
 269 
CASE COMMENTARY 
vi) Where each party is able to meet his or her needs, fairness may 
well not require a departure from the agreement.”25 
 
The Judge placed great emphasis on the fact that the children of the family 
in Luckwell spent time with each parent and so he concluded “the financial 
circumstances of each of their parents are likely to impact upon their 
welfare”.26 The task for the judge in this case was to carry out a balancing 
exercise between the needs of Frankie in his role as the children’s father and 
the weight to be placed on the three agreements, each entered into freely with 
the benefit of expert legal advice and without the vitiating factors in many 
cases of duress or non-disclosure. He emphasised the damaging effect on the 
children of the stark contrasts in current standard of living which existed 
between the mother and the father. “Even if not in his capacity as a former 
husband, then certainly in his role as a loving and committed father, Frankie 
has a very pressing need for secure accommodation in which he can 
accommodate all three children together and which does not demean him too 
much relative to their mother.” This is a clear and established principle of 
family law.27 
The final order of the Judge was to ensure that the father was adequately 
rehoused by Victoria in a property which could accommodate all three 
children when they visited him. He ordered that a house should be purchased 
at a price not exceeding £900,000. This house would be owned by Victoria 
and when the youngest child reached the age of 22 the house would be sold 
and the proceeds divided between the parties with 45% reverting to Victoria 
and 55% used to fund a home for the father. There was an additional order 
that the wife should pay the husband an additional £292,000 for furniture, a 
car and to meet his liabilities, which amounted to debts in excess of £220,000. 
He also commented during the course of his judgment on the huge cost of the 
hearing to the parties which had run into a figure of just over £550,000 with 
further ancillary costs of over £100,000 and the likelihood that that sum 
would rise further. It was in his words “an exceptionally bitter hearing”.28 
 
25 Luckwell (n 16) [130]. 
26 Ibid [131]. 
27 Mr Justice Holman cited the following words of Sheldon J in Cartwright v 
Cartwright (1983) 4 FLR 463, 471 to illustrate this point: ‘when considering the 
financial background of the parties, the standard of life that they and the children have 
been accustomed to, and that the children will undoubtedly continue to enjoy while 
living with [their mother], I am of the opinion that it is of importance to the children, 
to their maintenance of good relations between them, that he too should have a settled 
and secure home to which they can come.’ 
28 Luckwell (n 16) [6]. 
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THE LAW COMMISSION REPORT ON PRE-MARITAL 
SETTLEMENTS 
 
Mr Justice Holman referred to the fact that the Law Commission was due 
to report on pre-nuptial arrangements at the same time as he gave judgment in 
this case.29 The report was made the day before judgment and in the event the 
findings of the Report would not have impacted on the outcome of this case 
but were significant in the context of the status of pre-nuptial agreements. The 
Law Commission reported on pre-nuptial settlements as part of its wider 
project on matrimonial property: Matrimonial Property, Needs and 
Agreements: the Future of Financial Orders on Divorce and Dissolution. 30 It 
acknowledged that the discretion reserved to the courts as to how much 
weight should be accorded to a pre-nuptial agreement was at odds with the 
treatment of pre- and post-nups in many parts of the world and also is at odds 
with the wishes of many couples.31 The recommendation in the Law 
Commission was for the Government to enact legislation to introduce 
“qualifying nuptial agreements” which would be enforceable contracts, not 
subject to the scrutiny of the courts. These contracts would enable couples to 
make their own contractual arrangements about the financial consequences of 
divorce or dissolution.32 A “qualifying nuptial arrangement” would be subject 
to certain procedural safeguards and could not be used to contract out of 
“financial needs”. It is unlikely therefore that the agreement in Luckwell v 
Limata33 would have been enforceable as even if it met the conditions for 
such an agreement the claimant husband would still have been able to 
demonstrate “financial need”. The procedural safeguards recommended by the 
Law Commission included: the need for the agreement to be contractually 
valid (without evidence of undue influence or misrepresentation); all 
agreements must be made by deed and each party must sign a statement 
saying that they understand the nature of the agreement; agreements must not 
be made within 28 days of the marriage; the need for disclosure of material 
information about the other party’s financial situation and the need for legal 
advice to be given to each party. The Government responded to the 
publication of the Report with a short Press Release announcing that the 
29 Ibid [5]. 
30 Law Commission, ‘Matrimonial Property, Needs and Agreements’ (26 February 
2014) <http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/lc343_matrimonial_property.pdf> 
accessed 24 August 2014. 
31 See Law Commission, ‘Matrimonial Property, Needs and Agreements: The Future 
of Financial Orders on Divorce and Dissolution: Executive Summary’ (TSO 2014) 
[1.10]. 
32 Ibid [1.11]. 
33 Luckwell (n 16). 
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Ministry of Justice has tasked the Family Justice Council to take forward the 
Law Commission’s recommendation to clarify the law of “financial needs” on 
divorce or dissolution of a civil partnership.34   
 
COMMENT 
 
Until Radmacher v Grantino35 English courts had never formally given 
weight to pre-nuptial settlements when considering financial provision under 
the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. This view contrasts with the position in a 
number of other countries such as Canada, certain states in the US, and 
Germany, which all recognise such settlements and are willing to give them 
effect.36 Radmacher allowed the courts to place full weight on pre-nuptial 
agreements but set out certain conditions, which should first be met. The 
parties must enter into the agreement freely, without undue influence or 
pressure, having all the information material to his or her decision and they 
should both intend that it should be effective to govern the financial 
consequences of the marriage coming to an end. The court was unanimous in 
holding that such an agreement could not be allowed to prejudice the 
reasonable requirements of any children of the family under the age of 18. 
The underlying principle, which emerges from it, is that no agreement will be 
upheld if it is deemed to be “unfair” and the court held that it can be rendered 
“unfair” in two ways. Firstly, by the occurrence of contingencies unforeseen 
at the time of the agreement and secondly where, through circumstances 
prevailing at the time of separation, one partner would be left in a predicament 
of “real need” while the other enjoyed a sufficiency. The guidance given by 
Radmacher has been welcomed by both academics,37 practitioners38 and the 
Judiciary39 but it has many limitations and it is still open to the court to 
interpret when contingencies have arisen that were unforeseen at the time of 
the agreement and also what constitutes real need.  
34 www.gov.uk/Moj@MoJPress 016/14 Press Release Justice Minister The Rt Hon 
Simon Hughes MP Published 17 April 2014. 
35 Radmacher (n 1). 
36 See generally Jens Scherpe (ed), Marital Agreements and Private Autonomy in 
Comparative Perspective (Hart Publishing 2012); Katharina Boele-Woelki, Joanna 
Miles and Jens Scherpe (eds), The Future of Family Property in Europe (Insentia 
2011). 
37 See generally Jens Scherpe, ‘Marital Agreements: Private Autonomy and Fairness’ 
[2011] CLJ; Jens Scherpe, ‘Fairness, Freedom and Foreign Elements – Marital 
Agreements in England and Wales after Radmacher v Granatino’ [2011] CFLQ 513. 
38 Ashley Murray, ‘Pre-Nuptials, LSPs and Compensation Guidance: Before and 
After the Law Com Report’ [2014]  FLJ 491. 
39 See Mr Justice Mostyn in  Kremen v Agrest [2012] EWHC 45. 
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Therefore there remains the issue of defining what a court deems to be 
“unfair”. One circumstance mentioned in Radmacher was when one party is 
left in “real need”. “Need” is a subjective concept and is subject to a judge’s 
interpretation. In Radmacher the “need” of Nicolas Granatino was in marked 
contrast to the “need” of Frankie Limata in Luckwell. In both cases the courts 
overrode the autonomy of the parties and awarded financial provision. 
Holman J observed in Luckwell “If benevolent parents wish to provide gifts to 
their child, but not to his or her spouse, how (in the absence of legislative 
change) can they ever safely do so in reliance upon agreement of this kind if 
they do not prevail in this case?” He continued by commenting that he had 
sympathy with the father of Victoria who had said in court that it would be 
outrageous if the court made an order at all.40 Nevertheless an order was made 
in favour of the claimant husband.  
The lengthy Report of the Law Commission show that the law concerning 
financial provision on divorce is in grave need of reform.41 It accepted that the 
parties need to be given some autonomy in reaching an agreement concerning 
their own financial affairs should the marriage breakdown on cost alone this 
reform is urgently needed. However it is difficult to see the law extending to 
upholding any agreement even where it meets the qualifying conditions which 
can be deemed “unfair”. Holman J awarded the claimant husband financial 
relief in Luckwell not because “need” were a trump card that will always 
trump agreements but instead because the agreement itself was inherently 
“unfair”. It made no provision at all for the husband and in his view it was this 
factor that made it “unfair”. This suggests that autonomy in pre-nuptial 
agreements will always be subject to possible scrutiny by the courts where the 
actual terms and not the circumstances of the agreement are deemed to be 
“unfair”. Lawyers advising the parties when drawing up a pre-nuptial 
agreement will have to advise their clients on what a court might deem to be 
considered “unfair” or else their client will risk long and expensive litigation 
as seen in Luckwell. 
40 Luckwell (n 16) [136]. 
41 ‘Matrimonial Property, Needs and Agreements’ (Law Commission, 17 October 
2014) <http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/areas/marital-property-agreements.htm> 
accessed 24 August 2014. 
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